Abstract. The stream ciphers Py, Py6 designed by Biham and Seberry were promising candidates in the ECRYPT-eSTREAM project because of their impressive speed. Since their publication in April 2005, a number of cryptanalytic weaknesses of the ciphers have been discovered. As a result, a strengthened version Pypy was developed to repair these weaknesses; it was included in the category of 'Focus ciphers' of the Phase II of the eSTREAM competition. However, even the new cipher Pypy was not free from flaws, resulting in a second redesign. This led to the generation of three new ciphers TPypy, TPy and TPy6. The designers claimed that TPy would be secure with a key size up to 256 bytes, i.e., 2048 bits. In February 2007, Sekar et al. published an attack on TPy with 2 281 data and comparable time. This paper shows how to build a distinguisher with 2 268.6 key/IVs and one outputword per each key (i.e., the distinguisher can be constructed within the design specifications); it uses a different set of weak states of the TPy. Our results show that distinguishing attacks with complexity lower than the brute force exist if the key size of TPy is longer than 268 bits. Furthermore, we discover a large number of similar bias-producing states of TPy and provide a general framework to compute them. The attacks on TPy are also shown to be effective on Py.
Introduction
Timeline: the Py-family of Ciphers -April 2005. The ciphers Py and Py6, designed by Biham and Seberry, were submitted to the ECRYPT project for analysis and evaluation in the category of software based stream ciphers [2] . The impressive speed of the cipher Py in software (about 2.5 times faster than the RC4) made it one of the fastest and most attractive contestants. The cipher is designed to be used with a key of size 32 bytes (the key size may vary between 1 byte and 256 bytes) and an IV of size 16 bytes (the IV size can vary between 1 and 64 bytes). showed key recovery attacks against the ciphers Py, Pypy, Py6 with chosen IVs [11] . This attack was subsequently improved by Isobe et al. [5] . -January 2007. Three new ciphers TPypy, TPy, TPy6 were proposed by the designers [1] . These three ciphers can very well be viewed as the strengthened versions of the previous ciphers Py, Pypy and Py6 where the above attacks do not apply. The ciphers are designed to be secure for any key size between 1 and 256 bytes. -February 2007. Sekar et al. published an attack on TPy which requires 2 281 data and comparable time [9] .
In this paper, we show distinguishing attacks on the ciphers TPy and Py with data complexity 2 268.6 each. These results outperform the most recent attack on TPy which requires 2 281 data [9] . However, it is worth noting that the attacks described in [7] can also be applied to TPy. In the design specifications, the TPy and the Py are claimed to be compatible with key size ranging from 8 bits to 2048 bits. If the ciphers are used with key size longer than 268 bits then our attacks are better than exhaustive search. It is also worth noting that the distinguisher can be built within the design specifications of the ciphers. To derive the distinguisher, 2 268.6 randomly chosen key/IVs are used and for each of them one outputword is collected. Note that, according to the design specification, TPy can run for 2 61 rounds (note that each round generates 8 bytes as output) per key where our distinguisher requires only 8 rounds per key.
In addition to the above distinguisher, we detect biases in a large number of outputs at rounds r, r + 2, t and u where r > 0; t, u ≥ 5; t ∈ {r, r + 2, u}; u ∈ {r, r+2, t}. We provide a general framework to compute the biases due to the presence of arbitrarily many weak states. However, we were unable to combine those biases into a more efficient attack. Combining multiple distinguishers into a single and more efficient one is still an alluring open problem.
The Round Function of TPy
The round functions of the TPy and the Py are identical. Here, we analyze only the round function of TPy and hence do not describe the key setup and IV setup. Algorithm 1 describes a single round of the TPy. Array P (which is a permutation of [0, 1, ..., 255]), array Y (which contains 260 32-bit elements) and the 32-bit variable s are the inputs to the algorithm. Here, 'rotate(A)' denotes a cyclic rotation of the elements of array A by one position. The 'ROT L32(s, k)' operation means that the 32-bit variable s is rotated to the left by k positions. The output generated in line 5 of the algorithm is labeled 'first output-word' and the output-word of line 6 is labeled 'second output-word'. 
Algorithm 1 A Step of TPy

Notation and Convention
-O a(b) denotes the bth bit (b = 0 denotes the least significant bit or lsb) of the first output-word generated at round a. We do not use the second output-word anywhere in our analysis. -P a , Y a+1 and s a are the inputs to the algorithm at round a. It is easy to see that when this convention is followed,
denote the bth elements of array Y a and P a respectively.
tively. -The operators '+' and '−' denote addition modulo 2 32 and subtraction modulo 2 32 respectively, except when used with expressions which relate two elements of array P . In this case they denote addition and subtraction over Z.
-The symbol '⊕' denotes bitwise exclusive-or and denotes set intersection. 
Motivational Observations
Our major observation is the detection of a relation between the elements of the internal state and the outputs of the TPy which can, eventually, be used to build a distinguishing attack on the cipher. The relation is outlined in the following theorem.
if the following 17 conditions are simultaneously satisfied. then the following equations are satisfied:
Proof. From Figure 1 , we get
(1)
Generalizing (1), we have 
Generalizing the above, we can write
Let the c 7 denote the carry in the above equation. Since ROT L32(s 7 , 25) i = s 7(i−25 mod 32) ,
Lines 3 and 4 of Algorithm 1 give us
where k = P 7 [116] + 18 mod 32, d 7(i) = f 7(i) ⊕ g 7(i) and d 7(0) = 1 (f 7 and g 7 are the carry terms in (5) which are explained in Sect. 5.2). For simplicity, henceforth we denote X (i mod 32) by X (i) . Thus (6) becomes,
If j = i − 25 mod 32, then (7) becomes
Substituting (8) in (4), we get,
Next, we have
where e 7 is the carry term in (10) . Substituting (11) in (9), we get,
Now, if k = −11 (i.e., k ≡ −11 mod 32 ⇒ P 
By similar arguments, when
From (9), we get
When k = 0 (i.e., P 1 [116] ≡ −18 mod 32), the above equation reduces to
Similarly, when P 3 [116] ≡ −4 mod 32, we have
From (13) and (14), we derive the following results:
This completes the proof. Proof. Equation (5) gives us:
The first condition (P 1 [116] ≡ −18 mod 32) reduces this to
Therefore, 
This completes the proof. Now we observe that, when the conditions listed under (i) Lemma 1 (i.e., events E 1 , E 3 , E 4 and E 5 ) and (ii) Lemma 2 (i.e., events E 1 , E 2 , E 6 and E 7 ) are simultaneously satisfied, then the expression
is the XOR of the terms which are listed in Table 1 (grouped according to the bit positions).
2 Similarly, the 'carries' in Table 1 are elaborated in Table 2 . If the Y -terms in Table 1 are pairwise equated (this is achieved when the events E 8 through to E 16 occur) then we get
Now, when the RHS of (21) equals zero (i.e., E 17 occurs) we get
This completes the proof.
Computation of the Bias
In this section, we quantify the bias in the outputs of TPy induced by the fortuitous events similar to the one described in Sect. 4. Now it is important to note that there may be more than one set of 17 conditions possible, where each of them results in
= 0 (let us assume that there are n such sets). In Theorem 1, we listed one such set. Our experiments suggest that these n sets are mutually independent, however, a formal proof of that is nontrivial. Each of the events E 1 to E 5 occurs with approximate probability 1 32 and each of the events E 6 to E 16 occurs with probability which is approximately 1 256 . Let p denote the probability that condition 17 is satisfied. Let F denote the event 16 j=1 E j . Therefore,
We see that there are n F -like events (i.e., the intersection of 16 conditions). Let F n denote the union of these n events. Since, each event occurs with approximately the same probability,
From Table 1 , we get the maximum number of ways that terms of a particular column can be pairwise equated and hence the upper bound on n can be calculated to be 2 · 2 · 945 = 3780.
Formulating the Bias
Now, we establish a formula to compute P [O 1(i) ⊕O 3(i+7) ⊕O 7(i+7) ⊕O 8(i+7) = 0], under the assumption of a perfectly random key/IV setup and the uniformity of bits when F n does not occur.Our experiments suggest that it is infeasible to find a set of conditions such that the overall bias (computed on the basis of the aforementioned assumption of randomness in the event that F n does not occur) is canceled or reduced in magnitude. Therefore, this assumption is reasonable.
. Then using Bayes' rule we get
Hence, we see that the distribution of the outputs (
is biased. The bias is equal to n·(2p−1)· 1 2 114 . In the following section, we provide formulas to compute p, i.e., the probability that E 17 occurs; or more generally, the probability that the 17th condition of each of the n F -like events occurs, i.e.,
Biases in the Carry Terms
In this section, we provide formulas to calculate the bias in the carry terms. The carry terms c and e are generated in expressions of the form (S ⊕ X) + Z. We now proceed to calculate P [c l(i) = 0] assuming that S, X and Z are uniformly distributed and independent. Under this assumption,
, that is, the probability that the carry bit at position i equals zero depends only on i. Stated otherwise, P [c (i) = 0] = P [e (i) = 0]. Let P [c (i) = 0] be denoted by p i . Since there is no carry on the lsb, p 0 = 1. We now have Table 3 .
From Table 3 , using Bayes' rule we get
Solving this recursion, given p 0 = 1, we get
Now, the carry terms f and g are generated in expressions of the form S +X −Z. This can be rewritten as S+X+Z c +1 since the additions in these two expressions are modulo 2 32 . The presence of two carries in S + X + Z is demonstrated using the Figure 2 . The carries generated in S + X + Z c + 1 can be thought of as carries generated in S + X + A where A = Z c and the carries on the lsb f (0) = 1, Table 3 . Truth table for computing pi (NR=Not Required)
. Hence, q 0 = 0, r 0 = 1 and r 1 = 1. Now we have Table 4 . From Table 4 , using Bayes' rule we get
Using the initial conditions, q 0 = 0, r 0 = 1 and r 1 = 1, q i and r i are computed recursively. Since d m(i) denotes f m(i) ⊕ g m(i) for any m > 0,
Using the above formulas, the value of p can be computed for any given i. Running simulation, we find that the maximum bias in the chosen outputs occurs Table 4 . Truth table for computing qi and ri+1 using qi−1 and ri−1 (NR=Not Required) 
when i = 25. Substituting n = 3780 in the above equation, we get:
This is an upper bound on the probability that the outputs (
) of TPy are biased. From Sect. 4, we found that n ≥ 1. From the previous discussion, we see that n < 3780. Hence, 1 ≤ n < 3780. If n = 1, then
6 The Distinguisher A distinguisher is an algorithm which distinguishes a given stream of bits from a stream of bits generated by a perfect PRBG. The distinguisher is constructed by collecting sufficiently many outputs (
) generated by as many key/IVs. To compute the minimum number of samples required to establish the distinguisher, we use the following corollary of a theorem from [6] .
Corollary 1.
If an event e occurs in a distribution X with probability p and in Y with probability p(1 + q) then, if p = In the present case, e is the event 2 ) = O(2 268.6 ) output samples are needed to construct the best distinguisher with a non-negligible probability of success. Note that this is an improvement by a factor of 2 12.4 over the data complexity of 2 281 obtained in [9] .
A Family of Distinguishers
In Sect. 4 we found that the outputs at rounds 1, 3, 7 and 8 are biased allowing us to build a distinguisher. It is found that there exist plenty of 4-tuples of biased outputs. The generalization is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The distribution of the outputs (O r(i) , O r+2(i+7) , O t(i+7) , O u(i+7) ) of the TPy are biased for many suitably chosen (r, t, u)'s where r > 0; t, u ≥ 5; t ∈ {r, r + 2, u}; u ∈ {r, r + 2, t}.
The proof is similar to the proof furnished for Theorem 1, however, a detailed proof has been provided in the Appendix A of [10] . This allows us to construct a family of distinguishers for the cipher TPy. It seems possible to combine these huge number of distinguishers in order to construct one single efficient distinguisher; however, any concrete mathematical model to combine them is still an interesting open problem. Another major implication of the above generalization theorem is the fact that the TPy outputs will remain always biased no matter how many initial outputwords are discarded from the keystream.
Attacks on Py
The PRBG of the cipher Py is identical with that of TPy. The attacks described in the previous sections exploit the weaknesses in the PRBG of TPy only. Therefore, all the attacks are applicable to Py also.
Conclusions and Open Problems
The paper develops a family of distinguishers from the outputs (O r(i) , O r+2(i+7) , O t(i+7) , O u(i+7) ) of TPy (and Py), where r > 0; t, u ≥ 5; t ∈ {r, r + 2, u}; u ∈ {r, r + 2, t}. Note that the TPy is one of the strongest members of the Py-family of ciphers. The best distinguisher works with data complexity 2
268.6
which records an improvement of a factor of 5404 over the previous attack. In addition, we detect a large number of bias-producing states of TPy and compute them in a general framework. It is reasonable to assume that these weak states can be combined to mount a more efficient attack on TPy; however, methods to combine many distinguishers into a single yet more efficient one is still an open problem.
